



ANNUAL REPORT 2024

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CEO'S ADDRESS



In 2024, the global anti-corruption movement and Transparency International Russia (in exile) faced new challenges. Civil society organisations experienced a significant decline in funding from institutional donors. Authoritarian governments moved to restrict further public oversight and monitoring, in particular by progressively closing access to socially significant information and enforcing repressive laws. We were designated a “foreign agent” for the second time.

For many kleptocrats, Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine became an instrument for holding on to power and redistributing resources. In this context, we see it as a priority to expose the war’s beneficiaries; those who secure privileges for themselves and their close circles. In February, we published the report ‘War and Corruption’, which provides a systemic analysis of the causes and consequences of the war and highlights weaknesses in the current sanctions architecture.

Contrary to popular belief, rising corruption does not bring armed conflicts to an end. Analysing corrupt practices is essential both to gather evidence that international courts may use in the future and to design future anti-corruption strategies that reflect the realities of wartime corruption.

Investigative work has always been our strong suit. We do not stop at publishing findings. We press for follow-up advocacy, as seen in our investigation into the outflow of dirty money from Russia to the UK via electronic payment systems. Some of the actors named in that investigation later indicated a willingness to improve their internal policies to reduce corruption risks.

Another important outcome was our confirmation that firms in London and Edinburgh, operating through intermediaries, continue to trade with Russia. Additionally, companies registered in the UK’s Overseas Territories continue to serve as a hub for purchasing Russian energy resources in exchange for routing potential dual-use goods and luxury items to Russia. These schemes and the cross-border corruption risks they entail have drawn the attention of UK parliamentarians, thanks to our publications.

We consistently argue that corruption affects everyone: it triggers systemic human rights abuses, undermines security, and forces society to bear the consequences of these abuses. A clear example is our report on corruption and money-laundering risks in importing medical equipment into Russia. Sanctions-evading schemes inflate prices, in some cases by more than fifty percent, with the burden falling on taxpayers. The informal supply-chain routes we identified also degrade the quality of equipment, with patients bearing the most significant harm.

Preparing an annual report is not only about taking stock and assessing results; it is also about communicating them effectively. It is also an opportunity to thank everyone who supports our work. We are grateful to our volunteers, event participants, readers, donors, and partners. Only together can we move closer to our shared goal: maximum control over corruption.

Sincerely,
Alyona Vandysheva
Chief Executive of Transparency International Russia

CPI-2024: RUSSIA'S RECORD LOW

In 2024, Russia scored 22 out of 100 and ranked 154th of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) — the worst result in Russia's history. Azerbaijan, Honduras, and Lebanon received the same score.

The downward trend continues: in 2020, Russia scored 30, and the figures have fallen each year since. Even against regions where corruption is traditionally high, Russia's position has worsened.

RUSSIA

Score **Rank** **Score change**
22/100 **154/180** **↓ -4** since 2023



Score changes 2012 - 2024




Chart: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/rus>

Score	Country	Rank
90 =	Denmark	1
88 ↑	Finland	2
84 ↑	Singapore	3
83 ↓	New Zealand	4
81 ↑	Luxembourg	5
81 ↓	Norway	5
81 ↓	Switzerland	5
80 ↓	Sweden	8
78 ↓	Netherlands	9
77 ↑	Australia	10
77 ↑	Iceland	10
77 =	Ireland	10

15 ↓	North Korea	170
15 ↓	Sudan	170
14 ↓	Nicaragua	172
13 ↓	Equatorial Guinea	173
13 ↓	Eritrea	173
13 ↓	Libya	173
13 ↓	Yemen	173
12 ↓	Syria	177
10 ↓	Venezuela	178
9 ↓	Somalia	179
8 ↓	South Sudan	180

Chart: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/rus>

Among leaders, little has changed. For the seventh consecutive year, Denmark tops the ranking (90), followed by Finland (88), a decade-long top-three performer. Singapore (84) rose to third place, surpassing New Zealand (83) after it lost two points.

The global average remains at 43, signalling no substantial improvement. Over two-thirds of countries score below 50, showing persistent problems with transparency and the rule of law. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the regional average stayed at 35, making it one of the least transparent regions worldwide.




Chart: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/rus>

ESCALATING REPRESSION

2024 brought another tightening of Russia's repressive policy. Expanded notions of "extremism", "terrorism", "espionage", and "discrediting the army" were increasingly used against journalists, human-rights defenders, and activists. Independent media and civic initiatives faced blocking orders, forced closures, inclusion in the "foreign agents" register, and designation as "extremist organisations". Tighter control over the internet, restrictions on access to information, and widespread website blocking became core elements of the state's strategy to suppress civic activity and alternative viewpoints.

Repression affected not only the political opposition but also broader social groups, such as the LGBT+ community, religious and ethnic minorities, and migrants. Citizens who criticised the authorities or condemned the war risked criminal prosecution.

2.5 years in prison for an article

In February 2024, a Moscow court sentenced Oleg Orlov, co-chair of Memorial, to two years and six months in a penal colony for an anti-war publication, on the grounds of "repeated discrediting of the army". The case became a theme of the year: a prison term for expressing an opinion.

Record number of "undesirable organisations"

In 2024, 65 names were added to the list of "undesirable organisations" by the authorities, the highest annual number on record. The status carries strict criminal liability for journalists and activists for "participation" or "co-operation".

"Special accounts" for "foreign agents"

By year-end, a new law introduced direct financial sanctions: passive income inside Russia (dividends, interest, rental income, etc.) must be paid into a special account inaccessible to the "foreign agent". This new requirement marks a new level of economic pressure on individuals and NGOs designated under the regime.

Blocking and throttling platforms

On 8 October, the communications regulator officially blocked Discord. In December, YouTube effectively stopped functioning normally in Russia, with traffic reportedly falling to around 20% of typical levels, resulting in a de facto block via throttling. For independent content and investigations, this sharply narrowed distribution channels.

A "foreign-agent" case against Ilia Shumanov

On 24 August 2024, a criminal case was opened against Ilia Shumanov, then Director of TI-Russia, under the "foreign agent" legislation, and he was placed on the federal wanted list, ostensibly for "failure to comply with the obligations of a foreign agent" (including labelling requirements). Mr Shumanov is safe and continues his work; our team's operations were not affected.

Bottom line: targeted criminal cases replaced mass detentions

In 2024, mass round-ups gave way to targeted criminal prosecutions for public speech: posts, live streams, and public remarks. Courts increasingly handed down real prison terms under articles such as Article 205.2 (public "justification of terrorism"), Article 207.3 ("fake news" about the army), and Article 280.3 (repeated "discreditation" of the military). Administrative protocols and fines remained, but criminal law became the principal tool of coercion.

WAR AND CORRUPTION

By the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Transparency International Russia team published the study 'War and Corruption'. The report took eighteen months to prepare and brought together the work of five experts.


We conclude that the war is, to a great extent, a product of Russia's corrupt system of governance, which has allowed a narrow circle to concentrate control over national resources. This same system has also exposed the poor readiness of Russia's armed forces: large-scale embezzlement, incompetent leadership, and systemic inefficiency has cost the state tens of billions of roubles every year.

During the war, corruption has manifested at three levels:

- ▶ **Everyday corruption:** petty embezzlement at the grassroots and bribes in military recruitment offices.
- ▶ **Administrative corruption:** abuses in public procurement and state-business interactions.
- ▶ **Elite corruption:** the involvement of senior officials and oligarchs who profited from defence contracts and the redistribution of assets. International sanctions were aimed at this group, yet rather than changing their behavior, they have often strengthened loyalty to Vladimir Putin.

We also note that the current sanctions policy does not lead to behavioural change among Russia's elites and may even strengthen their position.

Civilian casualties, tens of thousands of wounded, and millions of refugees are the direct outcome of Vladimir Putin's policy and a corrupt authoritarian regime. Preventing, combating, and remedying the consequences of corruption must become one of the principal priorities in Russia's post-war reconstruction of its state and society.



Link to the report: https://ti-russia.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/06/war_corruption.pdf

TI-RUSSIA AT IACC-2024



From 18-21 June, 2024, the International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) took place in Vilnius. Experts from Transparency International Russia took part in two discussions: “War and Corruption: Time for a Closer Look” and “CSOs in Exile: How Not to Become ‘Grant-Eaters’.”

In the first panel, Vladislav Netyaev, Head of the Dirty Money Department, presented the study “War and Corruption: Corrupt Causes and Consequences of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” demonstrating the link between corrupt practices and the conflict. Particular attention was paid to the dynamics of corruption in Russia and its impact on regional security.

The second discussion featured Ilya Shumanov (then CEO of TI-Russia). The session focused on practical ways for civil-society organisations in exile to maintain independence and operational effectiveness under constrained funding and political pressure. Colleagues from Myanmar and Azerbaijan presented cases on the use of digital tools to monitor state institutions from outside national jurisdictions.

Despite being unable to operate inside the country, Transparency International Russia continues to present research and expertise at international forums, upholding professional standards and expanding partnerships to counter corruption.




THE BESSEBERG CASE

In 2024, a Norwegian court found Anders Besseberg, former President of the International Biathlon Union (IBU), guilty of corruption and sentenced him to three years and one month in prison. The judgment recorded improper benefits, including expensive watches, paid hunting trips, and other services; the court separately noted favourable treatment of the Russian side during Besseberg's tenure. The defendant announced his intention to appeal.

At the prosecution's request, Ilya Shumanov (then TI-Russia CEO) was called as an expert witness. His testimony addressed corruption-influence practices typical of Russia's state and para-sport sectors, as well as the personal and institutional links between Russian officials, the Russian Biathlon Union, and the IBU during the relevant period. The expert evidence explained undue-advantage schemes and conflicts of interest in international sports governance.

The ruling sent a crucial signal to international sports federations and the anti-doping community about the importance of accountability for corruption that undermines competitive integrity and the reputation of sport. It also reaffirmed the value of independent expertise and cross-border co-operation in corruption cases at the intersection of sport, politics, and public funding. Our expertise remains in demand; TI-Russia stands ready to work with all those seeking to understand the nature of corruption in Russia and design effective counter-measures.



TI-RUSSIA TURNS 25

In 2024, Transparency International Russia marked its 25th anniversary. The country has changed, the legal context has shifted — our principles have not: openness, integrity and the defence of the public interest.

Corruption continues to inflict systemic harm on individuals and institutions, distorting access to social services, creating risks in infrastructure projects, and eroding trust in the justice system. The security and foreign policy dimensions demand special attention: throughout the year, we highlighted how corruption exacerbates conflicts and leads to severe human and economic costs.

Over the last 25 years, our organisation has:

Conducted investigations and analytical projects on dirty money, sanctions, and evasion schemes.

Developed educational programmes and materials for citizens, journalists, and partners.

Participated in international coalitions and professional debates, shaping the anti-corruption agenda.

Maintained transparency and compliance standards, adapting processes to new risks and constraints.

Despite being unable to work inside Russia and being stigmatised by legal labels, the organisation has preserved its independence, relaunched operations in exile, and continued to contribute to international anti-corruption efforts.

This anniversary became a point of reflection and recommitment: we strengthened partnerships, expanded research and communications, and maintained consistent quality across all workstreams.



THREATS TO THE TI MOVEMENT

Georgia

In 2024, the authorities revived and passed the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence,” requiring NGOs and media with more than 20% foreign funding to register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”. The parliament adopted the law on 14 May; a presidential veto was subsequently overturned on 28 May. The EU expressed “deep regret”, warning of chilling effects on civil society and risks to European integration; the UN and human-rights organisations issued similar assessments.

Transparency International called on the government to withdraw the bill and end attacks on civil society, including TI Georgia. In September 2024, Eka Gigauri, Head of TI Georgia, testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, describing the pressure on NGOs and the personal risks faced by human rights defenders. Throughout the year, TI Georgia continued to conduct public monitoring, engage with international partners, and conduct legal analysis of the law’s impact on freedom of association and expression.

Hungary

In 2024, Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) began operating under Act LXXXVIII/2023, which the Venice Commission criticised in March 2024 for disproportionate restrictions and risks to democratic processes. On 25 June, the SPO announced an investigation into Transparency International Hungary and Átlátszó for allegedly “influencing voters” with foreign funding. TI Hungary viewed this as pressure and filed a constitutional complaint on June 19. On July 1, the TI Secretariat condemned the investigation. International media and institutions recorded that TI Hungary was among the first targets of the new body.

TI-Russia stands in solidarity with TI Georgia and TI Hungary. Our own experience with stigmatizing statuses and restrictions makes the consequences for association, expression, and privacy unmistakable. We support international recommendations to align national laws with human-rights obligations and the rule of law.

SHADOW FLOWS

In August 2024, we published an investigation into a tangled network for laundering Russian-origin funds in the UK using electronic payment systems.

We found an illicit market on the Russian-language dark web for verified business accounts with the following payment platforms: Payrow, Paysend, ANNA Business, and Gemba Finance. These accounts are registered to front persons, often EU and UK citizens, using genuine documents, enabling large-scale laundering schemes.

Unlike personal wallets, business accounts are not subject to the same transaction-value limits, which creates a significantly higher risk of moving substantial sums with little control. Russian politically exposed persons, business elites, and criminal entities may exploit these vulnerabilities to facilitate large-scale money laundering, posing risks to financial stability in European and global markets. The investigation outlines intricate corporate and offshore arrangements designed to obscure beneficial ownership.

Our colleagues at TI-UK presented the report to the National Crime Agency (NCA). After publication, several payment companies contacted us to discuss the issues identified; representatives of ANNA Business, in particular, expressed readiness to review internal policies and close vulnerabilities.

We stress the need to strengthen anti-money laundering measures and expand international cooperation to close loopholes exploited for illegal financial operations. Our findings highlight the need for enhanced oversight of electronic payment systems and advanced monitoring to detect suspicious activity.



Link to the report: <https://ti-russia.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/10/doklad-red-3.pdf>

BOTTLENECK

In December 2024, we released a study on international trade between Russia and the UK since the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

We asked whether there is still room for UK-Russian illicit trade operations and at what scale. To answer, we analysed official statistics and available for us customs declarations from 2022 to 2024.

Findings show that London and Edinburgh companies, incorporated through intermediaries previously linked to laundering schemes, are still being used for trade with Russia.

Additionally, firms registered in the UK Overseas Territories remain hubs for purchasing Russian energy resources and exporting potential dual-use goods and luxury items to Russia.



ADVOCACY

We actively promoted our research within UK policymaking. Following the publication of the Bottleneck study, the UK Government issued a joint communiqué with representatives of the Overseas Territories detailing measures against dirty money and sanctions evasion. The report was added to the House of Commons Library as a reference resource for MPs. Our findings were cited during a hearing of the Business and Trade Sub-Committee on Economic Security, Arms and Export Controls, where MPs noted the unexpected nature of the schemes uncovered. With support from Transparency International UK, MPs submitted ministerial questions about Russian assets in the UK and about the government's plans to curb abuse of electronic payment systems for money laundering.

We have consolidated the practice of pairing major publications with targeted engagement in parliaments, with regulators, and with leading media, to ensure that solid analysis is translated into practical measures.

UN Convention against Corruption

In 2024, we submitted proposals to the 15th session of the Implementation Review Group in Vienna as part of the UNCAC Coalition, alongside more than 400 NGOs from 110 countries. We proposed five practical changes: full publication of all review mechanism materials; mandatory engagement of civil society (including observer access); a predictable review calendar; systematic follow-up on recommendations; and assessment of practical implementation using transparent indicators, along with civil society participation in technical assistance. We recorded resistance from several states (including Russia, China, and Iran) on CSO access and meeting openness. Our position remained unchanged: citizens and independent organisations must have tools to influence reviews, including through alternative reports.

G20

In 2024, TI-Russia's researcher Kristine Baghdasaryan presented our proposals at a Transparency International roundtable in Paris, ahead of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group meetings under Brazil's presidency. We advocated for close cooperation among public authorities, businesses, and TI chapters across countries; a greater role for civil society in detecting corruption schemes; robust whistleblower protection; and enhanced international coordination among financial intelligence units to counter cross-border flows. We also joined an open letter from 18 TI chapters to G20 leaders with three core demands: public beneficial-ownership registers, stricter oversight of professional enablers involved in money laundering, and deeper multilateral cooperation.

FATF

In 2024, we conducted an independent assessment of Russia's compliance with key Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and submitted recommendations to regulators on how to encourage alignment with these standards. Our conclusion is unequivocal: Russia systematically deviates from FATF requirements, particularly in relation to virtual assets and VASP compliance (KYC, transaction monitoring, and sanctions implementation). These results informed our public analysis of crypto-mediated sanctions evasion and "grey" payment routes.

DIAGNOSING SUPPLY CHAINS

In December 2024, we detailed how Russian companies evade sanctions to continue importing high-tech medical equipment from Western countries. CT scanners, X-ray machines, and other medical imaging devices enter Russia through intermediaries in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Türkiye.

Our research indicates that a substantial portion of these supplies passes through intermediaries registered at fictitious addresses or affiliated with Russian importers. Inflated prices, a lack of manufacturer warranties, and opaque deals pose significant risks to consumers.

We call for much stricter supply-chain due diligence by Western manufacturers and greater transparency when working with intermediaries.



Link to the report: <https://ti-russia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/riski-korрупциj-pri-импорте-medоборудованија-v-rossiyu-1.pdf>



‘FOREIGN AGENTS’. AGAIN

On 27 December, the penultimate working day of 2024, the Russian Ministry of Justice added Transparency International Russia to the register of “foreign agents” again. This time, the entry targeted the legal entity operating in exile from a safe country. Previously, our Russian legal entity held this status from 2015 to 2023. In March 2023, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation designated the Transparency International movement as an “undesirable organisation”; following this, our Board resolved to liquidate the legal entity. In autumn 2023, we relaunched operations in exile as part of the global Transparency International movement based outside the Russian Federation.

This repeated inclusion in the “foreign agents” register has not affected us. It does not affect our operations abroad, nor does it alter our mission: our team has been working from a safe jurisdiction since 2022.

Transparency International Russia’s position remains unchanged: stigmatising labels and the persecution of civil society are incompatible with building resilient democratic institutions. Corruption threatens public safety and fuels systemic human-rights violations. In the reporting year, we preserved our independence, ensured continuity of operations in exile, and continued our research, advocacy, and educational projects on the international stage.



*caption on the jacket: ‘I think I’m a foreign agent’

EDUCATION AND EVENTS

In 2024, 1,429 people participated in our educational and outreach programs (compared to 1,286 in 2023, representing an 11% increase), including at least 307 school and university students and young professionals. Training formats enrolled 238 participants across four tracks: anti-corruption practice, transparency of public institutions, open-data analysis, and countering money laundering. New courses in comparative anti-corruption policy and public procurement were prepared for launch.

Over the year, we provided at least 99 consultations for alumni and partners on investigative tools, legal analysis, and the design of public education initiatives. Mentoring support helped 105 alumni launch their own projects or join media outlets and NGOs. 95% of participants reported increased knowledge and readiness to apply anti-corruption tools in practice.

Our experts participated in discussions and taught sessions at Palacký University (Czech Republic), the University of Bern (Switzerland), and the Royal

United Services Institute (RUSI) (United Kingdom). Joint activities with EU partners focused on academic integrity, open-source intelligence (OSINT) methods, and countering money laundering. We also shared our experience with colleagues in Kyrgyzstan on academic integrity and interactive anti-corruption education, advised partners in Iraq on whistleblower protection, and worked with partners in Uzbekistan on engaging women in anti-corruption initiatives. Our team co-organised an anti-corruption education session at IACC, together with TI Kenya, TI Nigeria, TI Hungary, TI Ghana, and Step Up Nigeria.

By year-end, our thematic communities included around 680 participants. Approximately 70 volunteers contributed regularly, with 45 of them providing continuous support, assisting with data collection and verification, preparing materials, and facilitating project delivery.



MEDIA

In 2024, Russian independent outlets once again worked under constant pressure: websites and channels were blocked or technically throttled; newsrooms were fined and labelled “foreign agents”; criminal cases were opened over publications; journalists were placed on wanted lists and arrested in absentia. Even so, audiences continued to find their way to the facts via newsletters, mirrors, podcasts, and VPNs. This resilience ensures investigations are completed and essential topics remain in public view.

We are grateful to the newsrooms we worked with regularly in 2024, from daily comments and fact-checks to joint episodes and publications. Among them: Dozhd (TV Rain), The Breakfast Show, Verstka, The Insider, Agentstvo, iStories (Vazhnyye Istorii), Meduza, Novaya Gazeta Europe, Radio Svoboda (Radio Liberty), Nastoyashchee Vremya (Current Time), Sirena, Populyarnaya Politika, The Bell, The Moscow Times, Vot Tak, Mediazona, Novaya Gazeta, 7x7, Zhivoy Gvozd, OVD-Info. This list is not exhaustive; throughout the year we also worked with regional and specialist outlets that bring complex issues to their communities.

Independent media, even in exile, serve as an infrastructure for public oversight: articles, broadcasts, datasets, and fact-checking safeguard the public interest every day. Supporting these outlets, through subscriptions, donations and sharing their work, remains the most direct way to preserve access to information.


The Transparency International Russia team thanks journalists and editors for their professionalism, courage and readiness to work with data and expertise so that important findings reach millions.



FINANCES


SOURCES OF INCOME

TOTAL INCOME € 671 596



TOTAL EXPENDITURES

€ 957 974





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and Tallulah Collis for their support
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TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL RUSSIA

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